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WOMEN'S VIRTUE
SUZANNA SHERRY*
Michael Perry's thoughtful jurisprudential musings in
Morality, Politics, and Law' get most things just right. His
framework of moral knowledge and a constitution of aspirations
resonates with much of the best of contemporary moral philoso-
phy and constitutional jurisprudence. When Perry turns to spe-
cifics, however, his reasoning weakens considerably. In
particular, his discussion of abortion is fundamentally flawed.
Perry draws two conclusions about abortion: (1) That the
extremely restrictive Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade 2-
which permitted abortion only to save the woman's life3 -was
unconstitutional; and (2) that the Supreme Court went too far
when it invalidated virtually all restrictions on pre-viability
abortions.4 Perry argues that the Court should have required all
anti-abortion laws to contain three exceptions. Abortion must
be permitted if the woman's health is endangered by continuing
the pregnancy, if the fetus's life would be short and painful
because of a genetic defect, or if the pregnancy was the result of
rape or incest.' Professor Perry's first conclusion is indisputable.
It is the second conclusion-that elective6 abortions should be
restricted-with which I take issue in this Essay.
Perry's conclusions appear to depend primarily on two
assumptions: (1) That the value of fetal life is the central issue in
determining whether elective abortions may be outlawed, and
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 174-75 (1988).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See id. at 117-18.
4. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 175; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66.
5. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 175.
6. Perry uses the words "elective" and "non-therapeutic" interchangeably, implying
that an abortion performed for reasons other than the direct physical health of the woman
or the fetus is not therapeutic, i.e., not helpful to the woman's well-being. Since I reject
that implication, I will use the word "elective" to distinguish abortions that are performed
for reasons other than the ones Perry lists. It is ironic that terminating a pregnancy that is
the result of rape or incest is generally considered (and apparently considered by Perry) to
be "therapeutic" or "non-elective," or at least analogous to physically therapeutic
abortions. Such a view recognizes the psychological harm that can come from carrying
some unwanted fetuses, and the therapeutic value of abortion in those circumstances, but
fails to recognize the psychological harm that results from carrying any unwanted fetus.
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(2) that the Texas statute probably would not have been enacted
without the discriminatory undervaluing of women's well-being.
I will suggest in this Essay that the first assumption is simply
incorrect, and that the second assumption does.not support the
second, restrictive conclusion that Perry reaches. This restric-
tive conclusion, moreover, is inconsistent with several of the fun-
damental theses of the book as a whole. In short, on the
abortion issue, Perry has simply gotten it wrong.
Perry's first assumption-that the value of fetal life is the
central issue-leads him to an erroneous criticism of Roe v.
Wade. Perry states that an absolute ban on outlawing pre-viabil-
ity abortions necessarily depends on the premise that "the pro-
tection of fetal life is not a good of sufficient [or 'more than
trivial'] importance" and that this premise is "widely contested
in American society."7 He concludes that the Supreme Court
should not have relied on such a premise.8 But the holding in
Roe does not depend on such a premise. Indeed, Perry's formu-
lation is merely a more moderate restatement of a widespread
mistaken belief: that the validity of abortion laws depends
wholly or primarily on whether the fetus is a human life. That
issue, despite its galvanizing rhetorical effect, is irrelevant. Even
if the fetus is not a human life (or is of only "trivial impor-
tance"), there may be reasons for discouraging abortion. 9 More
importantly, even if the fetus is a human life (or is of more than
"trivial importance"), there may be justifiable reasons for per-
mitting abortion.
Once we conclude that there may be reasons for or against
abortion independent of the importance or humanity of the
fetus, then the Court's decision to choose the woman over the
fetus must be defended or attacked on grounds other than
Perry's argument that the Court relied on a disputable premise.
Before I turn to those possible other grounds (which in fact com-
prise Perry's second assumption), I must of course defend my
7. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 174-75.
8. Id. at 175.
9. For example, we prohibit the inhumane destruction of kittens. We also prohibit
conduct that, although it does not involve the taking of human life, we view as detrimental
to the actor, such as prostitution or the use of some addictive drugs. Finally, there may be
circumstances under which we wish to increase population by prohibiting both birth
control and abortion. I do not mean to suggest that any of these laws (real or potential) are
necessarily constitutional; I only note that a conclusion that a fetus is not a human life (or
is of only "trivial importance") does not end the inquiry.
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contention that elective abortion may be justified even if the
fetus is a human life (or of more than "trivial importance").
The best argument is Judith Jarvis Thomson's. She sug-
gests an analogy: Imagine that in the middle of the night you, a
music-hater, are kidnapped, and your circulatory system is
plugged into that of a famous, critically ill violinist. Without
your blood supply, the violinist will die. You are assured that
after nine months the violinist will have recovered, and you may
be unplugged. Thomson then asks whether it is "morally
incumbent on you to accede to this situation." 10 Although the
violinist is of at least as much importance as any fetus, no law
requiring you to stay plugged into him--criminalizing your deci-
sion to pull out the connecting tubes-would or should be con-
sidered compatible with our traditional notions of liberty.
The persuasiveness of the analogy depends on the recogni-
tion that in both cases the real question is not the importance of
the dependent life involved. Rather, it is whether you (or the
pregnant woman) may be compelled to provide the aid without
which the violinist (or the fetus) will die. And it is clear that in
our society, there is a widely shared moral consensus that while
providing aid to others may be morally commendable, it is
neither morally nor legally required. In short, we do not recog-
nize a general principle (the Good Samaritan principle) that
requires people to aid others, even at little cost to themselves.
There are no other circumstances under which we impose a
moral duty to aid another when the cost to the Good Samaritan
is nine months of various physical disabilities followed by either
a lifetime of responsibility or a permanent psychological trauma.
We do not, in circumstances outside the context of abortion,
require even parents to render necessary aid to their children. It
is neither immoral nor illegal, for example, for a parent to fail to
run into a burning building to rescue his or her child. The
absence of a generalized Good Samaritan principle for parents is
even better illustrated by an example that does not implicate a
risk of parental death: It is neither immoral nor illegal for a
parent to refuse to donate a kidney or bone marrow to a dying
child. It may be morally laudable to render the aid, but that
does not make the failure to do so immoral.
What I have suggested so far, then, is that remaining preg-
nant, like remaining attached to the violinist (or saving one's
10. Thomson, A Defence of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
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child from a burning building), is a supererogatory act. No one
has a moral duty to perform such an act, but doing so may in
some circumstances be a moral virtue. Moreover, part of the
web of our traditions is to leave supererogatory acts to the dis-
cretion of the individual and not to coerce such acts by means of
legislation.1
The standard responses to the arguments made above are
(1) that the pregnant woman, unlike the kidnapped music-hater,
has in some sense volunteered to help the fetus and thus cannot
abandon it later; and (2) that our morality of aspirations sug-
gests that we ought to have a more generalized Good Samaritan
principle and thus that rather than decriminalizing abortion, we
ought to extend the principle of requiring aid to others.
By definition, a woman who wants an abortion is not volun-
tarily pregnant. The most that can be said is that the woman
voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse.12  Thus, the first
response reduces to an argument that a woman who engages in
sexual intercourse-however careful she may have been about
contraception-has thereby volunteered to aid any resulting
fetus. Such a contention strikes me as equivalent to suggesting
that anyone who walks outside at night has volunteered to be
mugged, or that anyone who drives on the highway has volun-
teered to become the victim of a drunken driver. At least in
some places, the odds are about the same. And yet we do not
expect people to refrain from engaging in these activities, nor do
we penalize or otherwise condemn them should they be unlucky
enough to suffer harm. 13 Only when a woman engages in inter-
course do we hold her legally and morally responsible for the
unwanted consequences of her innocent and very human
11. As I will suggest in a moment, coercing supererogatory acts is in fact antithetical
to Perry's notions of self-criticism and moral flourishing. Other questions must be
addressed first, however.
12. She may also have been negligent or even reckless, by misusing or not using
contraception. However, there is no effective way to distinguish between a pregnant
woman whose conscientiously used contraception failed and one who was negligent or
reckless in the matter of contraception. Indeed, such a distinction may be illusory in the
case of young girls who lack sufficient knowledge about contraception (or about their own
bodily functions) to be deemed reckless. Thus, the standard for judging any law
prohibiting elective abortions must be how it affects women who did everything they could
to avoid getting pregnant.
13. Significantly, the only analogous circumstance in which there is any generalized
tendency to blame the victim of the crime is when a woman is raped. See, e.g., S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); S. ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE (1987).
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Similarly, the second response-to generalize the Good
Samaritan principle-is suspect because only women (and
potentially almost all women) would be subject to the Good
Samaritan principle. Given the pervasive sexism of our society,
it is questionable to begin creating a generalized Good Samari-
tan principle by imposing a substantial duty only on women. As
Guido Calabresi has noted, "Compelled life saving is easier to
enact (and for that very reason constitutionally suspect) when
disfavored groups are forced to do the life saving."'-, Skepticism
is especially warranted in light of the length of time that abor-
tion has been prohibited without any further development of a
generalized Good Samaritan principle, 16 and in light of the dis-
proportion between what we demand of pregnant women
(donating their bodies for nine months) and what we even con-
template demanding of other proposed Good Samaritans.
Both of the standard responses to Thomson's violinist anal-
ogy thus depend on imposing on women unique responsibilities
not imposed on men in analogous circumstances.17 This anom-
14. The fact that technically we also hold men responsible for fathering children is
not very significant. Many fathers avoid responsibility either because they are unknown,
because paternity cannot be proven, or because child support obligations are widely
unenforced. See, ag., D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CHILD SUPPORT (1979). Moreover, the financial obligations imposed on both parents are
qualitatively different from requiring a woman to lend her body to the fetus. Our laws
recognize a vast difference between requiring monetary payments and requiring personal
physical acts. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.7, at 835-36 (1982); Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1583-88 (1979).
15. G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 103 (1985).
16. Indeed, when we do require persons to render aid, it is virtually always on the
theory that by their actions they have explicitly entered into a special relationship with the
victim. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323 (1965); W. PROSSER &
P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 378-82 (5th ed. 1984); Regan, supra note 14, at 1593-
1603. Thus, to the extent that we have a modified Good Samaritan principle, the principle
depends on whether one consented to a special relationship. This poses a problem
essentially identical to that posed by the first response to Thomson's analogy, see supra note
10 and accompanying text. Occasional attempts to require any more generalized principles
of Good Samaritanism have attached only minimal punishments to egregious failures to act
when there was no danger whatsoever to the actor. See Farber, Book Review, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 282, 287 & n.18 (1986).
17. The argument that there are no analogous circumstances depends on the original
assumption that in the abortion debate, the most important-and thus unique-question is
the status of the fetus. Once we discard that question, there are many analogous
circumstances, as suggested in the text. It is also possible to argue that the relationship
between the woman and the fetus is unique. That approach is also likely to fail, as there is
nothing unique about one entirely innocent being requiring the assistance of another in
order to live. Any attempts to distinguish a pregnant woman from other innocent beings
HeinOnline  -- 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1595 1988-1989
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aly implicates Perry's second assumption about Roe: That the
Texas statute is unconstitutional because in the absence of the
discriminatory undervaluing of women's well-being, such a
restrictive statute would never be passed."' Here Perry is abso-
lutely correct, but he fails to recognize the full implications of
his assumption. The arguments in favor of prohibiting elective
abortions-as I have distilled them to their essences-are argu-
ments that are only made against women's lives and choices, and
not against men's. Thus, in the absence of discriminatory under-
valuing of women's well-being, it is highly likely that anti-abor-
tion laws would not exist (or, as Perry puts it, "that conclusion
seems ... more plausible than any other").1 9
Perry's second, restrictive conclusion, then, does not follow
from his two assumptions. That conclusion, moreover, is incon-
sistent with a basic theme of his earlier chapters: that morality,
or flourishing, necessarily entails living the most deeply satisfy-
ing life one can, which itself requires "the exercise of self-critical
rationality. ' 20 In order to live a moral life, "[a] person should be
concerned to discover ... how she ... can do better-how she
can live in a more deeply satisfying way."'" Moreover, coercive
legislation is disfavored to the extent that it frustrates individual
"capacity for self-critical rationality. ' 22 The subtext of Perry's
argument here is that persons ought to strive continually to
improve their ability to exercise moral choices.2 3 Restrictive
whose assistance is necessary to the survival of others is likely to become tangled in the
equality questions raised in the text.
18. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 175-76.
19. Id. at 176. Although some women support anti-abortion laws, this conclusion is
not undermined. Even Perry agrees that people may mistake the conditions necessary for
their own flourishing and well-being. Id. at 78-82.
20. Id. at 30.
21. Id. at 49.
22. Id. at 99.
23. Unlike my colleague Dan Farber, see Farber, The Man Who Mistook His Life for
a Plant, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1445 (1989), I read into Perry's description of morality a
commitment to maintaining flourishing communities-in other words, a commitment to at
least some forms of altruism. As Richard Eldridge states, "others matter fundamentally to
the development and exercise of our capacities for self-understanding and for flourishing."
R. ELDRIDGE, ON MORAL PERSONHOOD: PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, CRITICISM AND
SELF-UNDERSTANDING [ms. at 3] (Univ. of Chicago Press forthcoming 1989). Moreover,
implicit in Perry's descriptions of both moral knowledge and flourishing is a notion that
living a deeply satisfying life means living the best human, and rational, life. Living a
moral life is approaching the ideal of what Alasdair MacIntyre has called "human-nature-
as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos." A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEORY 51 (1981). Thus, while Perry does not specify-except in particular
contexts-the content of living such a life, I believe he intimates that moral discourse is
1596 [Vol. 63
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anti-abortion laws deprive women of this moral opportunity.
If remaining pregnant, like remaining plugged into the vio-
linist, may be considered a supererogatory act, then the choice
between abortion and childbirth, although not morally man-
dated, is not morally neutral. While we do not require supere-
rogatory acts, we do consider them morally praiseworthy. Just
as we would not condemn the music-hater who unplugs herself
from the violinist, we ought not condemn the woman who termi-
nates an unwanted pregnancy. And just as we would praise the
music-lover who gives up nine months of her life for the sake of
the violinist, we might praise a woman who becomes pregnant
under difficult circumstances but decides to make whatever sac-
rifices are necessary for the fetus and later the child. Moreover,
the context of the woman's choice affects our view of its moral-
ity: a woman who chooses not to abort a child with Down's
Syndrome is more morally praiseworthy than a woman who
chooses not to abort a child of the "wrong" sex.
Anti-abortion laws deprive women of the opportunity to
choose freely among these discretionary moral choices, and
hence of the opportunity to exercise and improve their capacity
for moral knowledge and moral choice.24 Such laws coerce
women's moral decisions, stifling their ability for growth
through self-criticism. Anti-abortion laws thus interfere with
what Perry describes as the basic aspects of human morality and
human flourishing. Furthermore, to the extent that a moral
choice is coerced, the actor is less likely to accept responsibility
for that choice. The coercion of anti-abortion laws discourages
women from developing the moral sensibilities that come from
making moral choices and accepting responsibility for them. It
keeps them, in short, from becoming virtuous.
If Perry's constitution of aspirations is to mean anything, it
must mean that the government presumptively may not interfere
with individual development and exercise of rational self-criti-
communal discussion of what it means for individuals in a community, and the community
itself, to flourish. Indeed, this intimation is almost made explicit in Perry's
acknowledgment that feminist theory is one of the "bright spot[s] on the horizon of
political-moral theory." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 183. One of the prime distinguishing
features of feminist theory is its attention to connectedness to others.
24. For an elaboration of the relationship between making moral choices and
developing moral sensibilities, see, e.g., Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J.
293, 301 (1988). Studies suggest that most women do view the decision whether to
terminate a pregnancy as a profoundly moral choice. See R. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOVE
AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION 86-87, 212 n.124 (1988).
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cism, or with individual attempts to flourish (as he defines it)
and to become morally virtuous. Anti-abortion laws interfere
with both, and thus a strong justification for such laws is neces-
sary to overcome their presumptive unconstitutionality. The
Court's insistence that the state provide a compelling interest in
support of anti-abortion laws is therefore exactly what Perry's
theory of the Constitution requires.
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